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SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS CONTINUED

REF: USUN 0456

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Perm Five Permanent Representatives met at 5:00 pm Friday, March 10 at USUN to discuss the British-French draft elements on Iran. Discussion went round and round, as the Russians and Chinese had no specific instructions on the text, speaking instead in general terms about how to proceed. Both urged a much shorter text; the EU-2 agreed to provide a shortened, edited text by 5:00 pm Saturday, March 11. The next P-5 meeting will be held Monday, March 13 at 8:00 am at the U.S. Mission. End summary.

¶2. (C) Ambassador Bolton opened the meeting asking for reactions to the British-French text. Russian Ambassador Denisov said he could only provide general comments, and initially asked whether the point of this exercise is to maintain the non-proliferation regime and keep the Iranian issue under the control of the IAEA, or to punish Iran. He hoped it was the former, and suggested the elements provided for a text were placing formal requirements on Iran, rather than simply supporting IAEA efforts. He considered these elements more technical, not the parameters of the Security Council, and said that the specificity with this text was an ultimatum which would not allow for further negotiations if Iran changes course. The refocusing from the IAEA to the Council & we don't like.8

¶3. (C) On timing, Denisov suggested that the 14 day reporting period would not allow time for Iran to reverse course. He then raised the possibility of the rumored March 20 meeting of political directors in Vienna or New York which he said would be for one purpose: to discuss and reach agreement on the way ahead. This would not mean that the Council could not work on a text meanwhile but in doing so, the P-5 should keep in mind these general reactions from Russia. If we need to do something in the Council next week, perhaps a text could be considered as food for thought, or elements of a future statement.

¶4. (C) China Amb. Wang said he had no reply as yet from Beijing but as a general comment, &the Iran nuclear issue is at a crucial moment.8 Iran has a right to peaceful use but also has obligations under the NPT. We need balance. It is best to address this issue in the IAEA. The Security Council complicates the situation. But if colleagues think we need SC action, we should not replace the IAEA role, but reinforce and support it. He finished by reminding the group that there is still time for diplomatic action.

¶5. (C) Ambassador Bolton said the U.S. understanding after the London statement by our Foreign Ministers was that all five agreed that Iran's weapons program should be reported to the SC, as was then reflected in the February 4 Board of

Governors resolution. The FMs further agreed that none of the P-5 would take any action until after the March 6 IAEA meeting, in order to let things play out and to watch for any action by the Iranians that would change our views. Negotiations did not make progress during that period due to Iran; there was nothing new at the March 6 Board meeting, and the IAEA report was conveyed to the SC by the Director General. From the U.S. perspective, it is entirely appropriate to now consider next steps, and this draft before us was consistent with what the FMs agreed in London. The preamble supports the IAEA and the Board, and the elements fairly reflect the views as stated by Amb. Denisov. Amb. Bolton offered to work through the weekend or early Monday to move this process ahead, mentioning the leak to the press of the elements as making it difficult for the P-5 not to circulate something to the P-10 Monday or Tuesday of next week. It would be appropriate to do so in any event, and a plus if the P-5 could agree on a text first, though either way we should distribute to the others early in the week.

16. (C) British Ambassador Jones-Parry assured the Russians that the text was meant to support the NPT and the IAEA, and to reinforce very clearly the facts in order to minimize the chance of Iran going nuclear. He said it would be perverse if the Council did not repeat what we have said in the IAEA, including specifying the end of enrichment, the end of R & D, the moratorium, and return to the Additional Protocol. As to the 14 day deadline, he said Iran could easily reverse its concealment in that time frame by making tangible, demonstrable efforts to show its intent. We have given Iran a lot of time and don't have much to show for it. Jones-Parry said we do not need to wait for a political directors strategy session in order to move forward, with the existing Ministers, understanding that we will support the IAEA, and urge Iran to comply with the Board decisions,

calibrated to be reversible by Iranian positive actions. He agreed with Amb. Bolton that we need to get a draft to the other Council members early next week.

17. (C) French Amb. de la Sabliere said he thought in principle we were all in agreement) to support the IAEA, and to put pressure on Iran. Time is running out with developments on the ground in Iran. The main question is how the Council can use its weight to strengthen the IAEA requests and have Iran respond positively. The elements include Board language expressing what Iran has done and the concerns of the international community. We cannot use general language, as it will not pressure Iran and will not reinforce the IAEA. Iran will think we are weakening what came out of Vienna. On timing, de la Sabliere said we need to reflect reality but also the emergency situation at hand. It could be 14, 18 or 20 days, but part of our discussion should include keeping in mind at each step, there will be more action if Iran does not respond. He suggested going paragraph by paragraph through the text to see where general problems exist.

18. (C) Russia said it was not ready to react to specific language. Denisov said the problem is not the 14 days indicated, but what would happen on day 15.8 He suggested we might start with a milder text which could be strengthened, rather than a strong text which would be weakened and appear non-constructive.

19. (C) China further complained about the length of the text, arguing that it was longer than the Board resolutions. He suggested a short text, supporting the IAEA, and one or two elements calling on Iran to comply with the IAEA. Ambassador Bolton explained that it might look long, but was reflecting three years of Iranian activity. This was not a technical issue) Iran was violating the NPT and seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, despite very generous offers that had not persuaded them to change course. If we do not incorporate the past three years, Iran will think we are going to start over again, a big mistake for Iran and for the Security Council. The key rests with Iran) if it is willing to give up its pursuit, this can be easily dealt

with.

¶10. (C) After a back and forth about how to proceed, the group agreed that the UK and France would edit and shorten the text in an effort to reflect the various P-5 comments, and would redistribute to the Five by 5:00 pm Saturday evening. It was also agreed that the P-5 would meet again Monday morning, March 13 at 8:00 at the U.S. Mission to continue discussion on the new text. All agreed that any statement to the press would simply be: &Good meeting, consultations continue.8

¶11. (C) Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton phoned German Ambassador Plueger to give him a readout of the meeting, and offered to debrief him on future discussions.
BOLTON